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JAMES E. FLEMING*

Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution†
In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have framed the basic choice as being between
originalism and living constitutionalism. Consider, for example, Jack
M. Balkin’s Living Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B.
Solum’s Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, and John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good
Constitution. I shall argue for the superiority of what Ronald Dworkin called “moral readings of the Constitution” and what what
Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. By “moral reading” and “philosophic
approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles – not codifying concrete historical
rules or practices – and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood – not
merely historical research to discover relatively specific original
meanings.
I shall argue that Dworkin’s and my conceptions of fidelity and
change are superior to those of originalism in its many varieties. For
our moral readings enable us to see what originalisms (besides
Balkin’s) obscure or deny: that one of the main purposes of the Constitution is to exhort us to change in order to honor our aspirational
principles and affirmatively to pursue good things like the ends proclaimed in the Preamble. Thus, the aspiration to fidelity requires
rather than forbids change. It aims for something better than preventing “rot,” as Scalia famously put it. I shall attempt to make good on
these claims by arguing that moral readings help us better understand the Constitution as both a framework for change and a charter
* Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in
Law, and Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School
of Law. I prepared a draft of this essay for the Academic Symposium on Comparative
Constitutional Change at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools. I am grateful to Richard Albert for the invitation to participate. I benefitted
from the opportunity appear in the Harvard Law School Federalist Society event on
John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s recent book, Originalism and the Good
Constitution (2013) and to present a draft of the essay in the Boston University School
of Law Faculty Workshop Series. Thanks to my research assistants Stephen Fox and
Evan Miller for helpful comments.
† http://dx.doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2014.0019
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of aspirations to which we owe fidelity. They enable us to see how the
multiple modalities of argument in constitutional interpretation (including original public meaning and precedent), rather than
preventing change, are sites in which we argue about, and sources
through which we justify, change: in particular, how best to realize
and thus to be faithful to our constitutional aspirations. Or, as Dworkin put it, how to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it
can be.
In sum, my topic is fidelity without originalism and change without living constitutionalism. I also ponder the reasons for the grip of
originalism in our constitutional culture as contrasted with its rejection elsewhere. I shall suggest that the reasons commonly offered in
fact demonstrate the grip of the aspiration to fidelity, not the grip of
originalism itself. And I shall contend that those reasons in fact show
the need for a moral reading or philosophic approach that conceives
fidelity as redeeming the promise of our constitutional commitments,
not an authoritarian originalist conception of fidelity as following the
relatively specific original meaning (or original expected applications)
of the Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have framed the basic choice as being between
originalism and living constitutionalism. Consider, for example, Jack
M. Balkin’s Living Originalism,1 Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B.
Solum’s Constitutional Originalism: A Debate,2 and John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good
Constitution.3 This formulation puts originalism on the side of fidelity and living constitutionalism on the side of change. Indeed, the
rhetoric of originalism is that of fidelity and the rhetoric of living constitutionalism is that of change.
This essay is part of my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution,4 in which I reject all forms of originalism, old or
new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin has called a “moral reading” of the Constitution5 and
what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to
1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011).
2. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE vii-viii (2011).
3. JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 1-2 (2013).
4. JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
5. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 2-3 (1996) [hereinafter FREEDOM’S LAW].
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constitutional interpretation.6 By “moral reading” and “philosophic
approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying
abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as
requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively specific
original meanings. I argue that the moral reading, not any version of
originalism, is the most faithful to the Constitution’s commitments.
Some readers may think that Dworkin’s and my approaches are
versions of living constitutionalism, but they are importantly different from it. I shall suggest that the prospects for reconciliation
between, e.g., Balkin’s and Solum’s new originalisms and moral readings are greater than those between new originalisms and living
constitutionalism. The basic reason is that the new originalists and
moral readers share a commitment to constitutional fidelity: to interpretation and construction that best fits and justifies the
Constitution. Living constitutionalists characteristically are more
pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking in their approaches
to the Constitution and, as such, tend to be anti-fidelity. Though,
truth be told, most living constitutionalists who supposedly think
this way are fabrications created in the minds of originalists like
Chief Justice Rehnquist (see his “The Notion of a Living Constitution”)7 and Justice Scalia (see his discussion of “the Living
Constitution” in his A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and
the Law).8
But, I shall argue, Dworkin’s and my conceptions of fidelity and
change are superior to those of originalism in its many varieties. For
our moral readings enable us to see what originalisms (besides
Balkin’s) obscure or deny: that one of the main purposes of the Constitution is to exhort us to change in order to honor our aspirational
principles embodied in the Constitution and affirmatively to pursue
good things like the ends proclaimed in the Preamble. Thus, the aspiration to fidelity requires rather than forbids change. But it does so in
the name of honoring our commitments and building out our framework of constitutional self-government with coherence, integrity, and
responsibility, rather than in the name of “updating” a “living” constitution. It aims for something better than preventing “rot,” as Scalia
famously put it.9
6. SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
THE BASIC QUESTIONS xiii, 155 (2007). See also JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 16, 210-11 (2006) (arguing for a
“Constitution-perfecting theory”).
7. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV.
693 (1976).
8. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 37-48 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION].
9. Id. at 40-41.
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I shall attempt to make good on these claims by arguing that
moral readings help us better understand the Constitution as both a
framework for change and a charter of aspirations to which we owe
fidelity. They enable us to see how the multiple modalities of argument in constitutional interpretation (including original public
meaning and precedent), rather than preventing change, are sites in
which we argue about, and sources through which we justify, change:
in particular, how best to realize and thus to be faithful to our constitutional aspirations. Or, as Dworkin put it, how to interpret the
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.10
In sum, my topic is fidelity without originalism and change without living constitutionalism. Some scholars, for example, Frank
Cross, have demonstrated “the failed promise of originalism.”11 I
shall show “the false promise of originalism.” In doing so, I shall illuminate the contrast between authoritarian (originalist) and
aspirational (moral reading) views of fidelity and change.
Finally, I shall ponder the reasons for the grip of originalism in
our constitutional culture as contrasted with its rejection elsewhere. I
shall suggest that the reasons commonly offered in fact demonstrate
the grip of the aspiration to fidelity, not the grip of originalism itself.
And I shall contend that those reasons in fact show the need for a
moral reading or philosophic approach that conceives fidelity as redeeming the promise of our constitutional commitments, not an
authoritarian originalist conception of fidelity as following the relatively specific original meaning (or original expected applications) of
the Constitution.
II. THE INCLUSIVENESS OF THE NEW ORIGINALISM
ITS DISCONTENTS

AND

A. The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism
Many have distinguished between the old originalism(s) and the
new originalism(s). I have explored this distinction in other work12
and will not repeat that discussion here. A striking characteristic of
all forms of new originalism is their inclusiveness. Balkin,13 Solum,14
and even Keith Whittington15 and Randy Barnett16 to some degree
10. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986).
11. FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013).
12. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91
TEXAS. L. REV. 1785 (2013) [hereinafter Are We All Originalists Now?]; James E.
Fleming, The New Originalist Manifesto, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 539 (2013); James E.
Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433 (2013)
[hereinafter The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism].
13. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 3-6.
14. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 2, at 35-36.
15. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 375 (2013) [hereinafter A Critical Introduction]; Keith E. Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF
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present originalism as an inclusive, big tent. First, the new originalists argue that constitutional adjudication embraces not only
interpretation but also construction. And they concede that construction is not originalist. (The old originalists, by contrast, insist that
constitutional adjudication legitimately includes only interpretation,
and that originalism is the only legitimate theory of interpretation.)
Second, they accept Philip Bobbitt’s argument that multiple modalities of interpretation and construction—not just originalism—
legitimately operate in constitutional law: the modalities of text, history, structure, prudence (including consequences), precedent, and
ethos (or spirit).17 And they concede that the multiple modalities are
not originalist. In fact, some new originalists have conceived originalism so inclusively that they have asked, “Are we all originalists now?”
and they have answered “Yes”!18
But in being so inclusive, they have made spectacular concessions to critics of originalism like the moral readers. For example, I
have argued that construction according to Balkin’s method of text
and principle is to all intents and purposes the equivalent of a moral
reading of the Constitution.19 And I have argued that interpretation
and construction through the multiple modalities is not driven by a
quest for the original meaning (in the manner of an originalism) but
instead for the best interpretation (in the manner of a moral reading).20 Indeed, the new originalists have unwittingly shown that
through construction and multiple modalities they are engaged in
making normative judgments that the moral readers have argued
were necessary in constitutional interpretation and construction and
that the old originalists have contended were illegitimate and forbidden.21 The originalism in the new originalism is not doing the heavy
lifting when it comes to making these normative judgments. In other
work, I have argued that it is moral readings that are doing that
work.22 Put another way, all the action concerning “change” (for example, through the normative judgments in construction and
multiple modalities) lies outside originalism. Remarkably, at the
same time that the new originalists have made such spectacular conCONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 70 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011)
[hereinafter On Pluralism Within Originalism].
16. Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 411 (2013).
17. PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8
(1982). See BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 2, at 59-60 (accepting “multiple modalities”); Whittington, On Pluralism Within Originalism, supra note 15, at 76 (accepting
“pluralism” of modalities).
18. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 2, at 1.
19. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669,
675-79.
20. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, supra note 12, at 442-43.
21. Id. at 443-44.
22. Id. at 445.
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cessions to the moral reading, they also have declared victory over it!
Again, they have claimed that we are all originalists now!23
B. Originalism ≠ Original Meaning
One further aspect of the inclusiveness of the new originalism is
that they have conceived originalism, well, too inclusively. I want to
draw two distinctions concerning what originalism is. First, I distinguish between (1) the theory of originalism and (2) the practice of
generic consideration of original meaning in interpreting the Constitution. Originalism is an ism, a particular theory of constitutional
interpretation holding that the relatively concrete original meaning
of the Constitution is the only legitimate source of constitutional interpretation. (Though originalists like Scalia typically make a
“pragmatic exception” for sources like precedent.24) By contrast, generic consideration of original meaning takes an eclectic approach
and regards it as one among several available sources of constitutional interpretation: “These sources include the document’s text,
history, structure, and purposes, as well as judicial precedent. They
also include contemporary social practices, evolving public understandings of the Constitution’s values, and the societal consequences
of any given interpretation.”25 We often see courts look to original
meaning in this latter sense. When doing so, courts typically have a
pragmatic attitude, sometimes finding evidence of original meaning
helpful, but often finding it inconclusive.26 This generic, eclectic consideration of original meaning as one among several available
sources of constitutional interpretation is not what we mean by
originalism.
Second, I insist that originalism ? original meaning. Originalists
like Justice Scalia commonly say that originalists are the only ones
who care about original meaning in constitutional interpretation.27
That is, Scalia asserts or assumes that originalism = original meaning. But, as Dworkin once put it, the debate between originalists and
other theorists is not about whether original meaning should count in
constitutional interpretation; rather, the debate is about what should
count as original meaning.28 That is, the originalists like Scalia conceive the relevant original meaning as the relatively concrete
understandings and expectations of the historical framers and ra23. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 2, at 1.
24. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 8, at
140.
25. GOODWIN LIU ET AL., KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 33 (2009).
26. Id. at 35.
27. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852-56,
862-64 (1989).
28. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 5, at 287-305; RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33-57 (1985).
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tifiers.29 Other theorists, like Justice Brennan and Dworkin, conceive
the relevant original meaning as the relatively abstract commitments, principles, and aspirations embodied in the Constitution.30
Both sides claim or aim for fidelity to the relevant original meaning
as they conceive it.31 The latter theorists argue that we can take
original meaning seriously—be faithful to it—without being
originalists.32
More generally, as Balkin has shown, most uses of history in constitutional interpretation are not originalist in the sense of what I am
calling “originalism as an ism:” in the sense of striving to be faithful
to the concrete understandings and expectations of the historical
framers and ratifiers. Instead, most uses of history are more abstract,
aspirational, or hortatory.33 This is how history functions in moral
readings.34 Not as it is said to function in conventional originalist
accounts: as determining answers to the questions that we confront
today.
C. Discontent with the New Originalism
The inclusiveness of the new originalism—and its concessions regarding construction and multiple modalities—was bound to provoke
a reaction within originalism. We see vigorous pushback against the
new originalism in the recent book by John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution.35 They show the
exclusive face of originalism. They want no part of the newness of the
new originalism. They reject the interpretation-construction distinction, denying the need for or the legitimacy of construction, not to
mention the multiple modalities.36 For them, the original meaning is
not so underdeterminative as to require construction. Where the original meaning seems underdeterminative, they are confident that
29. Scalia, supra note 27, at 854, 862-63.
30. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. J. 433, 433, 437 (1986); DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra
note 5, at 72-74.
31. Brennan, supra note 30, at 437; DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 5, at 712, 72-76; Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia,
Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249 (1997). See also LIU ET AL., supra note 25,
at 35-36.
32. James E. Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L. J. 1849
(1997).
33. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 641 (2013). See also Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L. J. 1765 (1997).
34. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now?, supra note 12, at 1810-12; James E.
Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1345-52
(1997).
35. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
36. Id. at 139-53.
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ordinary lawyers’ tools for resolving indeterminacy will be sufficient
to yield an answer without requiring construction.37
Not only do McGinnis and Rappaport condemn all versions of living constitutionalism; they reject all forms of originalism except their
own, original methods originalism: discovering and applying the original meaning using the original methods that the founders used and
accepted as legitimate.38 Indeed, they exclude from originalism all of
the leading theorists of new originalism: Balkin, Solum, Barnett, and
Whittington.39 For McGinnis and Rappaport, the only proper approach to interpretation is original methods originalism: that is the
only defensible conception of fidelity.40 For them, moreover, the exclusive legitimate approach to change is formal amendment through
Article V.41 I think McGinnis and Rappaport are going to be lonely in
their exclusive world of original methods originalism. In thinking
about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, I am going
to use their book as a foil.
Strikingly, although McGinnis and Rappaport reject the new
originalism, they do not exactly revert to the old originalism. For one
thing, they face up to the need to make normative arguments to justify originalism—that it fosters a good Constitution42—rather than
simply asserting or assuming (as the old originalists did) that
originalism is what interpretation just is. For another, they acknowledge that they are making a contingent argument for originalism
that applies to the American constitutional order but may not apply
elsewhere—again, they are not simply assuming (as the old originalists did) that originalism is true axiomatically. Finally, more than the
old originalists, they attempt to make peace with precedents that are
not consistent with original meaning as they conceive it.43
III. SUPER-MAJORITARIAN CONSTITUTION
GOOD CONSTITUTION

AS THE

McGinnis and Rappaport argue that super-majoritarian requirements of the American Constitution (Article V’s requirements of
proposal of amendments by 2/3 of both houses of Congress and ratification by 3/4 of the states) insure that only really good provisions get
adopted.44 For the sake of argument, let us concede that this is generally true. At the same time, we must acknowledge that supermajoritarian requirements might lead to some very good things not
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

118-21, 141-44.
14-15, 116-38.
139-40, 254 n.1, 255 n.6.
14-15.
81-99.
2.
154-96.
33-61.
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getting approved. Everyone’s favorite example here is the Equal
Rights Amendment, which would have prohibited denial or abridgement of equality on account of sex.45 The ERA was ratified by thirtyfive states, three short of the necessary 3/4. Yet, because of the success of the social movement behind the push for the ERA, and
because the Supreme Court adopted “intermediate scrutiny” for gender-based classifications, some scholars (such as Reva Siegel) have
argued that we nonetheless have a “de facto ERA.”46
Aside from amendments concerning topics like term limits for
presidents (two)47 and the date of the inauguration of a president
(January 20),48 what wins a 2/3 vote and 3/4 approval is typically
abstract. A consequence is that adopting it does not resolve future
problems of meaning but will require considerable judgment in interpreting and applying it. Consider, for example, freedom of speech,
free exercise of religion, unreasonable searches and seizures, cruel
and unusual punishment, equal protection, and due process.
Moreover, many things that win super-majoritarian approval do
so through what John Rawls called an overlapping consensus49 and
what Cass Sunstein calls incompletely theorized agreements.50 That
is, people support a given abstract proposition for their own independent yet overlapping reasons. There is not one authoritative reason
or justification. Proponents pull together shallow rather than deep
consensus or agreement. And the agreements are, as Sunstein puts
it, incompletely theorized. There is not one coherent theory or rationale that underlies the provision. The upshot is that many provisions
adopted will be general and will not be determinate. People will have
supported the proposal for different reasons, perhaps in spite of
rather than because of the reasons others offered for it. Or, after the
fact, the provision or framework adopted will have different reasons
to support it, whatever the original framers and ratifiers may have
thought were the reasons supporting it. The agreement will be shallow rather than deep—and so, there will not be a deeply, completely,
coherently theorized commitment. As a consequence, interpretation
and application will require judgment, even if we aspire to fidelity to
the original meaning of the Constitution.
To recapitulate, many things that win supermajority approval—
while presumably good—may not be determinately good. Their adoption will not have resolved the differences among those who made up
45. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 165 (2006).
46. Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
47. U.S. CONST., amend. XXII.
48. U.S. CONST., amend. XX.
49. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
50. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
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the overlapping consensus or who supported the incompletely theorized agreement. Thus, realizing the good of a provision or
amendment will depend upon interpreters using good judgment in
future interpretation of it.
Originalism as applied to such super-majoritarian commitments
is not likely to yield determinate interpretations. But McGinnis and
Rappaport remarkably, and inexplicably, argue that originalism is
necessary to preserve the goodness of the super-majoritarian Constitution.51 This is (1) false and in any case (2) a non sequitur. It is false
because originalism as applied to such super-majoritarian commitments is not likely to yield determinate interpretations. It is a non
sequitur because there is nothing about the super-majoritarian process or the super-majoritarian outcome that requires any particular
theory of interpretation, let alone originalism—unless, that is, one is
presuming that interpretation just is originalism. All the work remains to be done in deciding what theory of interpretation to apply
and how to justify it. A fortiori there is nothing about super-majoritarianism that requires McGinnis and Rappaport’s particular version
of originalism: original methods originalism. Similarly, there is nothing about super-majoritarianism that forbids a moral reading. To the
contrary, fidelity to a scheme that could win supermajoritarian support will require a moral reading, not forbid it. We will have to make
normative judgments in interpreting and applying our constitutional
commitments.
Despite these criticisms, I agree with McGinnis and Rappaport
to a certain extent that the goodness of the Constitution stems in part
from its supermajoritarian features and the obduracy of Article V to
constitutional amendment. But I think it is good for different reasons
than they do. Indeed, for the opposite reasons. In recent years, many
have criticized Article V for its obduracy to constitutional amendment.52 In support of Article V, I would make two points.53
First, I would give two cheers for Article V in a defensive sense,
for it has protected the Constitution and its citizens against the recent rash of “amendmentitis” (a term that Kathleen Sullivan has
used54). Numerous illiberal and ill-conceived amendments that would
erode basic liberties or limit important powers have been introduced
in Congress in recent years: the Flag Burning Amendment, the Balanced Budget Amendment, the Parental Rights Amendment, the
Religious Freedom Amendment, the Human Life Amendment, and
the Federal Marriage Amendment, to name a few. Despite the claims
51. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 12-15.
52. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 45, at 155-66.
53. In this paragraph and the next, I draw upon James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1533-34 (1998).
54. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT 20 (Fall
1995) (criticizing a rash of proposals to amend the Constitution).
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of representatives and senators in Congress to have a mandate from
the People, all of the measures that have come up for a vote have
failed to secure the two-thirds vote of both houses required by Article
V to propose an amendment for ratification by the states. Thus, Article V’s requirements have protected the Constitution and its citizens
from such measures.
Second, there is much to be said for Article V in an affirmative
sense. As Lawrence Sager has cogently argued, the obduracy of Article V to ready and easy amendment of the Constitution has
encouraged and fostered broad interpretation of the Constitution’s
rights-protecting and power-conferring provisions.55 It has underscored the character of the Constitution as a charter of “majestic
generalities”56—abstract principles, general powers, and general
frameworks and structures—as opposed to a code of relatively specific original meanings (as original expected applications). (Any
consensus in support of such majestic generalities or general
frameworks is going to be abstract and indeterminate, and it is not
going to resolve our problems for us.) Thus, Article V has underwritten approaches to constitutional interpretation like those of
Dworkin’s moral reading,57 Sager’s justice-seeking constitutionalism,58 and Barber’s and my philosophic approach59 (not to mention
David Strauss’s common law constitutional interpretation60). That is
as it should be, by design, not by accident. And not because “updating” judges have circumvented Article V as the exclusive route for
legitimate constitutional change. Rather, because that is the best
way to be faithful to our supermajoritarian, good Constitution.
Thus, the goodness of the super-majoritarian Constitution is
bound up with the moral reading or philosophic approach, not with
originalism in general or original methods originalism in particular.
Original methods originalism would undermine its goodness. In fact,
I have argued elsewhere, even if the framers and ratifiers expected
that we would interpret the Constitution according to originalism of
some sort, it is one of the “successful failures” of the American Constitution that we have not followed originalism.61 That is why
55. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONPRACTICE 164, 183-87, 213-19 (2004).
56. I allude to Justice Jackson’s famous formulation in West Virginia v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
57. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 5.
58. SAGER, supra note 55.
59. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 6.
60. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 115-39 (2010) (discussing the
“irrelevance of constitutional amendments”).
61. James E. Fleming, Successful Failures of the American Constitution, in THE
LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 29, 44-45 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo
eds., 2010).
STITUTIONAL
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originalists are second to none in criticizing our actual constitutional
practice for not being originalist.62
IV. ORIGINAL METHODS ORIGINALISM
As stated above, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that, to preserve the goodness of the super-majoritarian Constitution, we must
interpret it according to original methods originalism (and we must
amend it exclusively through Article V). In this section, I shall focus
my critique on original methods originalism. I have two criticisms:
one that emphasizes the peculiarity of original methods originalism
and another that emphasizes its familiarity!
Original methods originalism seems at first glance to be a peculiar constitutional theory counterpart to the Academy of Ancient
Music (England) or Aston Magna (United States): these are orchestras committed to performing, for example, Beethoven, using the
period instruments that Beethoven (so they say) intended his symphonies to be performed on. Recall Judge Posner’s famous critique,
“Bork and Beethoven,” relating Bork’s originalism to the authentic
performance movement.63 That critique applies a fortiori to McGinnis
and Rappaport’s original methods originalism. I ask, would anyone
seriously claim that the only way to realize what is good in Beethoven’s sonatas is to use period instruments? Would we take seriously
an objection to playing Beethoven on a Steinway grand piano rather
than an 1827 pianoforte that we found in Beethoven’s apartment in
Vienna or the like? We would not. We might appreciate the Academy
of Ancient Music—just as we might appreciate a re-enactment of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 with people wearing wigs and using quill pens. But we should look upon them as quaint antiquarians
rather than as guardians of the goodness of Beethoven’s compositions—or of the Constitution. It would be implausible to claim that
anyone who did not use period instruments was subverting the goodness of Beethoven’s compositions. We should view original methods
originalism in the same light.
Now, just what are the original methods to which McGinnis and
Rappaport’s original methods originalism would limit us? Here is the
part about familiarity. I had expected McGinnis and Rappaport to
give a thorough account of the methods or modalities or sources of
interpretation extant in 1787 (at the founding) and 1868 (at Reconstruction) and so on. I had expected some powerful demonstrations
that many of the modalities that we use today—in particular, those
62. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCLAW (1990); MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3; RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
63. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990) (reviewing BORK, supra note 62).
TION OF THE
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championed by the pragmatists, living constitutionalists, and moral
readers—had no counterparts in 1787 and 1868 and so on. Or, indeed, that they were specifically forbidden at those times. Or maybe
even that there were original methods with which we are not familiar—and which we now have to revive on pain of being charged with
illegitimately updating the Constitution! Instead, we get little more
than a couple of quotations from Blackstone and Story about the importance of text and intent in constitutional interpretation,64 plus
assurances that, if there were ambiguity or vagueness in a constitutional commitment, interpretive rules extant at the time would
resolve them.65 Beyond that, they make dogmatic assertions that
there was no such thing in 1787 or 1868 as “judicial updating” or living constitutionalism or dynamic interpretation.66 This core chapter
is the thinnest, weakest, and most conclusory of their book. I shall
limit my remarks to three criticisms.
One, McGinnis and Rappaport give us no reason to believe that
all of the familiar modalities of interpretation that we use today were
not used at the time of the founding or Reconstruction. Take, for example, Philip Bobbitt’s well-known typology of six modalities of
constitutional interpretation (which Balkin has helpfully reformulated as styles of justification67): text, history, structure, prudence
(including consequences), precedent, and ethos (or spirit).68 It is important to note that Bobbitt’s own illustrations of each of these
modalities date from early in our history. He is not saying we have
added new modalities to the original modalities as we have gone
along. More generally, proponents of each of these modalities claim to
find them in operation from the beginning of our constitutional system and throughout its history. McGinnis and Rappaport do not
make a convincing case that any, much less most, of these modalities
were not among the original methods of constitutional interpretation.
Nor that the approaches of living constitutionalism and the moral
reading were not extant at the time of the founding.
Two, McGinnis and Rappaport’s purported examples of canonical
original methods originalism do not support their arguments. For example, Blackstone’s and Story’s accounts of text and intent as sources
of meaning69 are so generic that I cannot imagine that anyone would
reject them. They hardly stand for contemporary originalism as an
ism. They instead represent traditional recourse to text and intent in
constitutional interpretation (as a generic consideration of text and
intent as available sources of constitutional meaning). They do not
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 135-36, 144-45.
Id. at 118-21, 141-44, 153.
Id. at 144-48.
Balkin, supra note 33, at 658.
BOBBITT, supra note 17, at 7-8.
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 144-45.
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cut ice in differentiating McGinnis and Rappaport’s method of
originalism from, say, Balkin’s living originalism or Dworkin’s moral
reading.
Three, I would argue that the original methods of 1787 and for
that matter 1868 did not include originalism as we know it today
(what I have called “originalism as an ism”). To explain, I shall recall
the distinction I drew earlier: (1) originalism as an ism versus (2)
generic consideration of original meaning as one among several available approaches in interpreting the Constitution. The latter existed
in 1787 and in 1868. The former originated in 1971, with the publication of Robert Bork’s “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems.”70 Indeed, Steven Calabresi has called Bork “the father of
originalism.”71 Before Richard Nixon’s and Robert Bork’s criticisms of
the Warren Court and the early Burger Court, originalism as an ism,
as we know it today, did not exist. You don’t have to take my word for
it. In addition to Calabresi, just read the work of the systematic theorists of originalism like Keith Whittington and Larry Solum. They
date old originalism as a negative, reactive attitude to the Warren
Court that began in the 1970s and was developed in earnest in the
1980s.72 The new originalism dates from 1999 (Barnett)73 or 2002
(Whittington).74
The most implausible claim that McGinnis and Rappaport make
is that original meaning or original intent is determinate enough to
resolve our problems today or, where it is not, original interpretive
rules will eliminate any ambiguity, vagueness, or indeterminacy.75
They say very little about what these interpretive rules are or about
how they will work in resolving ambiguities, vagueness, and disagreement. In any case, our most fundamental disagreements do not
typically involve ambiguities and vagueness as they conceive them;
instead, our deepest disagreements are about competing understandings of interpretive concepts, as Dworkin puts it.76 For example, is
the Equal Protection Clause best understood as embodying an anti70. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 1 (1971).
71. Steven G. Calabresi and Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and Constitutional Change: An Essay on Ollman v. Evans, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155, 155
(2013).
72. Whittington, A Critical Introduction, supra note 15, at 375-77; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599-602 (2004);
BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 2, at viii, 7-8.
73. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611
(1999).
74. Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 72. Whittington presented
drafts of this paper as early as 2002.
75. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 141-44.
76. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 158-70 (2011) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS].
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caste principle77 or a principle of racial neutrality (or a “color-blind
Constitution”78)? McGinnis and Rappaport do not provide any interpretive rules that would enable us to decide which of the competing
understandings of these concepts is the best interpretation. The
moral of the story is that original methods concerning the interpretation of text and intent, supplemented by original interpretive rules,
are not going to provide determinacy in interpreting abstract constitutional commitments. We will need to make moral, philosophic, and
jurisprudential judgments in deciding which—among competing
available interpretations—is the best interpretation of the
Constitution.
V. FIDELITY
OF

AS REDEMPTION VERSUS JUDICIAL UPDATING: THE CASE
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS

McGinnis and Rappaport have coarsened the debate in constitutional interpretation by reducing it to a clash between fidelity to the
Constitution through original methods originalism and judicial “updating” of the Constitution. Those who engage in construction or
moral readings are said to bypass Article V amendment through judicial “updating.”79 With all due respect, the style of justification of the
moral reading is one of fidelity to the Constitution in redeeming its
promises, rather than a rhetoric of judicial updating of the Constitution to keep it in tune with the times. I shall analyze briefly the case
of gay and lesbian rights, in particular, the concern for securing the
status of gays and lesbians as equal citizens as manifested in Romer,
Lawrence, and Windsor. My point will be that the idea of “updating”
does not capture what is going on, whereas the idea of fidelity to the
Constitution in redeeming its promises (Balkin)80 or making it the
best it can be (Dworkin)81 does.
On the McGinnis-Rappaport view, the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause in 1868 did not include a commitment to securing the status of gays and lesbians as equal citizens.82 Nor did it
in 1986, when Bowers was decided, holding that the Due Process
Clause did not protect a right of privacy or intimate association for
gays and lesbians.83 Nor in 1996, the year Romer was decided, hold77. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243-46 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 271-73 Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
78. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347-49 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-53 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 81-82, 100-01.
80. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 73-99.
81. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 255.
82. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 100-15 (analyzing the exclusion
of African Americans and women as “super-majoritarian failures”).
83. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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ing that the Equal Protection Clause did protect gays and lesbians
against legislation reflecting “animus” against, and “a bare . . . desire
to harm [them as] a politically unpopular group.”84 Nor in 2003, the
year of Lawrence, which overruled Bowers and held that the Due Process Clause did protect a right of autonomy or intimate association
for gays and lesbians.85 Nor for that matter in 2013, when Windsor
was decided, holding that the federal Defense of Marriage Act—
which defined marriage for purposes of federal law as the union of
one man and one women—reflected “animus” against, and “a bare . . .
desire to harm [gays and lesbians as] a politically unpopular group,”
as well as classifications that “demean” on the basis of sexual orientation, in violation of Equal Protection.86 And so, on their view, the
argument for interpreting the Constitution to secure the status of
equal citizenship for gays and lesbians is necessarily an argument for
judicial updating of the Constitution to keep up with current ideas of
equalityand illegitimate updating at that. (This is also how Justice
Scalia views these matters, as indicated in his dissents in Romer,
Lawrence, and Windsor.87)
As McGinnis and Rappaport see it, after Bowers, if you wanted to
secure the status of equal citizenship for gays and lesbians through
constitutional law, the only constitutionally appropriate route would
be to work for an Equal Rights Amendment protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination. To press for equality for gays and
lesbians, as a matter of constitutional interpretation and construction, without formally amending the Constitution, would be to seek
“judicial updating” of the Constitution, which is illegitimate.
Moral readers see the matter rather differently. On their view,
the Equal Protection Clause embodies an abstract commitment to securing the status of equal citizenship for all—on our best
understanding of what doing so entails.88 Perhaps in 1868, our best
understanding would have been that it principally protected the
newly freed slaves (or persons of African descent more generally).
Perhaps we would not have seen any analogies between the secondclass citizenship of the newly freed slaves and, for example, that of
women (much less that of gays and lesbians). But over time, we came
to appreciate those analogies, partly through the suffrage movement
culminating in the ratification of the 19th Amendment, partly
through the changing roles and place of women in the world, and
even partly through the failed campaign to ratify the Equal Rights
84. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
85. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 574 (2003).
86. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2693, 2694, 2695 (2013).
87. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 59498 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 5, at 72-74; BARBER & FLEMING, supra
note 6, at 82-84; FLEMING, supra note 6, at 5, 69, 70, 96, 118.
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Amendment. Through such developments, we came to see, for example, in Frontiero (plurality)89 and Craig (majority),90 that certain
longstanding history and tradition relegated women to second-class
citizenship and thus denied them equal protection. We came to a better understanding of our commitment to equal protection as
condemning second-class citizenship not only for newly freed slaves
and African Americans generally but also for women.
Ditto for the rights of gays and lesbians. In 1986, when Bowers
was decided, the Supreme Court did not see that longstanding history and tradition denied gays and lesbians the status of equal
citizenship.91 From Bowers through Romer and beyond to Lawrence
and Windsor, the Court came to see that gays and lesbians were being relegated to second-class citizenship—on our best understanding
of what equal protection and due process require. As Justice Kennedy
put it in Romer: “One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens’” (quoting from dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896)).92 Kennedy added that Colorado, by prohibiting protection of
gays and lesbians from discrimination, had “deem[ed] a class of persons a stranger to its laws” in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.93 As Justice Kennedy observed in Lawrence:
“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known
the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they
might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.”94
In other words, persons in every generation can seek to redeem the
Constitution’s promise of liberty.
Now, does the fact that we did not go through the formal
supermajoritarian procedures of Article V for amending the Constitution to protect gays and lesbians cheapen that evolution in our
understanding of the constitutional commitment to securing equal
89. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
90. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (majority opinion).
91. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (asserting that none of the precedents protecting a
right of privacy “bears any resemblance” to the case at hand).
92. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
93. Id. at 635.
94. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
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protection and the status of equal citizenship for all? Or does it imply
that those insights and hard-fought victories for gays and lesbians,
after centuries of second-class citizenship, were illegitimate? Should
gays and lesbians have proceeded differently in bringing people to
understand that longstanding laws were relegating them to secondclass citizenship? Should Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor be disparaged as illegitimate judicial “updating” and the much-maligned
Bowers be celebrated for upholding the legitimate Constitution (as
Scalia has argued95)? In sum, is there something wrong with how we
came to realize the promise or the implications of our commitments?
Hardly. These formulations simply do not capture what is going
on here. Instead, through interpretation grounded in analogies and
understandings rooted in our constitutional practice, we are redeeming the promise of equal protection and liberty for gays and lesbians.
We are realizing the best understanding of our constitutional commitments to securing the status of equal citizenship for all. This is
the moral reading’s rhetoric of fidelity as redemption of the promise
of the abstract commitment to securing the status of equal citizenship for all (I interpret Balkin, with his idea of fidelity as redemption
of the promises of the Constitution, as a moral reader96). It is not a
rhetoric of judicial updating (or even of living constitutionalism).
VI. ORIGINALISM: FAILED PROMISE

OR

FALSE PROMISE?

One tack in criticizing originalism is exemplified in Frank
Cross’s recent book, The Failed Promise of Originalism.97 Cross begins by granting the supposed appeal or promise of originalism, but
he proceeds to show that originalism does not deliver on that appeal
or promise. That’s what he means by the “failed promise” of originalism. Along similar lines is John Hart Ely’s famous critique of
originalism (or “clause-bound interpretivism”). He begins by granting
the “allure of interpretivism.”98 But then he shows that it is “impossible,” for it dispositively fails on its own terms: for the Constitution
itself, for example, in the Ninth Amendment, tells us not to be a
clause-bound interpretivist.99
My tack is different: instead of demonstrating the failed promise
of originalism, I show the false promise of originalism. I deny the appeal or promise of originalism unless we cast originalism so
abstractly that it is the functional equivalent of the moral reading or
philosophic approach (as with Balkin’s living originalism). Why do I
95. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Bowers is “unassailable” for those who believe in following the Constitution instead of making up a
living constitution).
96. Fleming, supra note 19, at 675-79 (analyzing BALKIN, supra note 1).
97. CROSS, supra note 11.
98. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-9 (1980).
99. Id. at 13.
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deny the appeal or promise of originalism?100 First, originalism, old
and new, is at bottom authoritarian, an insult to the founders for
their arrogance and an insult to us for our subservience. A regime of
purportedly dispositive concrete original meanings is, at best, beside
the point in constitutional interpretation and, at worst, an authoritarian regime that is unfit to rule a free and equal people. To add
further insult, its proponents serve it up to us in the name of
democracy!
Second, originalism, old and new, makes a virtue of claiming to
exile moral and political theory from the province of constitutional
interpretation. That is neither possible nor desirable, nor is it appropriate in interpreting our Constitution, which establishes a scheme of
abstract aspirational principles and ends, together with a general
framework of structures and powers, rather than a code of detailed
historical rules. Interpreting our Constitution with fidelity requires
judgments of moral and political theory about how those principles,
frameworks, and structures are best understood.
Third, originalism, old and new, misconceives fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Under the best conception of fidelity—as
integrity with a moral reading of the Constitution—we conceive fidelity as honoring our aspirational principles—the principles to which
we as a people aspire, and the principles for which we as a people
stand—rather than as following our historical practices and concrete
original understandings or meanings, which surely have failed to realize our aspirations. Ironically, in the name of interpretive fidelity,
originalists would enshrine an imperfect constitution that does not
deserve our fidelity. The moral reading, because it understands that
the quest for fidelity in interpreting our imperfect Constitution exhorts us to interpret it so as to make it the best it can be, offers hope
that the Constitution may deserve our fidelity, or at least may be able
to earn it.
Finally, I reject the irresponsibility of originalism: originalists
fail to take responsibility for the decisions we have to make in interpreting the Constitution; instead, they say, “We didn’t do it, the
framers and ratifiers did it!”
The commitment to fidelity is a commitment to honor our aspirations and framework for constitutional self-government: to build
them out with integrity and responsibility—not to evade responsibility by claiming that we are just following the commands of the
founding fathers and that they have already made our decisions for
us. The former view also reflects an understanding of the Constitution itself as a framework for furthering the good things proclaimed
in the Preamble—and an understanding that being faithful to the
100. In this paragraph and the next, I draw upon Fleming, Are We All Originalists
Now?, supra note 12, at 1805-06. See also BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 6, at 97-98.
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Constitution by honoring its aspirations will entail change as we confront new problems in new circumstances. We confront such
problems with an attitude of integrity and responsibility, not of following commands that have already made our decisions for us. And
not with an attitude of “updating” in the forward-looking, anti-fidelity sense of hackneyed versions of living constitutionalism. I do not
call that updating the Constitution. I call it being faithful to the Constitution by redeeming its promises, thereby interpreting it so as to
make it the best it can be. In that sense, fidelity entails change.
VII. A FRESH START CONCERNING FIDELITY
It is time for a fresh start in thinking about fidelity and change
in constitutional interpretation. Conventional formulations of the
clash between originalism and living constitutionalism have enabled
the originalists to claim a monopoly on concern for fidelity and enabled originalists to disparage living constitutionalists as attempting
to “change” or “update” the Constitution rather than be faithful to
it.101 Living constitutionalists, both wittingly and unwittingly, have
willingly gone along with this rhetoric and its implications.102 Moral
readers like Dworkin have rejected these formulations,103 but this
has not been sufficiently appreciated.
We should begin at the beginning, by observing that the aspiration to fidelity raises two fundamental questions:
Fidelity to what? and What is fidelity? The short answer to
the first—fidelity to the Constitution—poses a further question: What is the Constitution? For example, does the
Fourteenth Amendment embody abstract moral principles or
enact relatively concrete historical rules? The short answer
to the second—being faithful to the Constitution in interpreting it—leads to another question: How should the
Constitution be interpreted? Does faithfulness to the Fourteenth Amendment require recourse to political theory to
elaborate general moral concepts or prohibit it and instead
require historical research to discover relatively specific
original understanding or meaning? And does the quest for
101. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 81-82, 100-01; SCALIA,
supra note 8, at 37-48; Scalia, supra note 27, at 852.
102. For example, I fear that David Strauss’s arguments in support of living constitutionalism as common law constitutional interpretation are more “anti-fidelity” than
is necessary and than is good for him. See STRAUSS, supra note 60, at 24. The same
may be true of Erwin Chemerinsky’s arguments for living constitutionalism as an
“open-ended modernism.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 129,
133 (1987). By contrast, Liu, Karlan, and Schroeder’s recent defense of a living constitutionalism is cast in terms of fidelity and “keeping faith with the Constitution.” LIU
ET AL., supra note 25.
103. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
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fidelity in interpreting the Constitution exhort us to make it
the best it can be or forbid us to do so in favor of enforcing an
imperfect Constitution?104
On pain of being charged with illegitimately “updating” the
Constitution?
Let’s begin with the question, Fidelity to what?105 My answer is
fidelity to our abstract constitutional aspirations, including ends,
principles, and basic liberties, together with our general constitutional framework of structures and powers. Fidelity to our
aspirations does not entail obligation to follow the past in the sense of
concrete original meanings. That would enshrine an imperfect Constitution that falls short of our aspirations and does not deserve our
fidelity.
Next, let’s consider the other question, What is fidelity? It is not
fealty, or subservience. It is not following the authority of the past in
the manner of an authoritarian originalism. Furthermore, it is not
obligation to the concrete past, whether original meaning or precedents. Rather, fidelity is honoring our aspirations and pursuing our
commitments by furthering our best understandings of them. The
concrete original meaning and precedents are evidence of good-faith
efforts to pursue those aspirations, but they are not the aspirations
themselves. They have no doubt fallen short of our aspirations. If following those sources from the past dishonors our aspirations and
undermines our commitments, we have good reasons to reject them
in order to pursue our aspirations and commitments.
Moreover—to return to the question, Fidelity to what?—we
should aspire to fidelity to our scheme as an ongoing frame of government pursuing the ends of the Preamble, not as a set of concrete
original meanings or a string of precedents. Again, I do not say that
we have an obligation to follow the concrete past, though I do say that
we aspire to fidelity to the Constitution. How can we aspire to fidelity
while rejecting an obligation to the concrete past?
If we conceive the Constitution as a frame of government, to be
lived under and worked out over time, we can approach it with an
attitude of fidelity but without an obligation of obedience to concrete
expected applications or precedents. Fidelity on this understanding
entails a commitment to making the frame of government work, to
learning from experience, and to interpreting the Constitution so as
to further its ends and realize its aspirations.
Fidelity? Yes. Commitment? Yes. Obligation or obedience in an
authoritarian sense to original expected applications or precedents?
104. Fleming, supra note 34, at 1335.
105. In this section, I draw from James E. Fleming, Fit, Justification, and Fidelity
in Constitutional Interpretation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1291-92 (2013).
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No. Fidelity is not obedience to decisions already made for us in the
past by people who are long dead and who were ignorant of the challenges and problems of our age. Fidelity, rather, is an attitude of
commitment to making the scheme work and to further developing it,
building it out over time, as Balkin puts it,106 in ways to better realize its ends and our aspirations. Or, as Dworkin and I put it, to
making the Constitution the best it can be.107
Let me encapsulate the contrast between two radically different
attitudes toward fidelity and change. On the authoritarian originalist
view, fidelity in constitutional interpretation requires preventing
change by preserving relatively concrete original meanings and longstanding historical practices. On the aspirational view, fidelity
requires criticizing longstanding historical practices and pursuing
change in order to realize the Constitution’s aspirational, transformative principles and purposes.
For example, for moral readers such as Justice Brennan, Justice
Ginsburg, or Justice Stevens, the point of adopting and amending the
Constitution is not to embody longstanding historical practices, but
to transform them in pursuit of our constitutional aspirations to normative principles like equality and liberty. Brennan wrote,
“Interpretation must account for the transformative purpose of the
text. Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a preexisting society but to make a new one, to put in place new principles that the
prior political community had not sufficiently recognized.”108 He continued, “Thus, for example, when we interpret the Civil War
amendments . . . we must remember that those who put them in place
had no desire to enshrine the status quo. Their goal was to make over
their world.”109 That is Brennan’s conception of the abstract, aspirational original public meaning of the Civil War Amendments,
including the Fourteenth Amendment.
For Brennan, Ginsburg, and Stevens, the Fourteenth Amendment commits us to equal protection on our best understanding, not
equality as it was reflected in the common law and statute books in
1868, with all manner of racist, sexist, and heterosexist expectations
and presuppositions.110 It also commits us to liberty on our best un106. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 3.
107. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 255; FLEMING, supra note 6, at 16, 210-11.
108. Brennan, supra note 30, at 438. In this paragraph and the next, I draw upon
Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, supra note 12, at 448.
109. Brennan, supra note 30, at 438.
110. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Civil War Amendments used ‘language [that] authorized transformative new federal statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality.’”
(quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 361, 363, 399
(2005))); Reva B. Siegel, Equality’s Frontiers: How Congress’s Section 5 Power Can
Secure Transformative Equality (as Justice Ginsburg Illustrates in Coleman), 122
YALE L.J. ONLINE 267 (2013).
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derstanding, not liberty as it was manifested in the common law and
statute books as of 1868.111 As they see it, originalists seeking to enforce Scalia-like conceptions of original public meaning eviscerate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s transformative purposes. Such originalists
subvert the aspiration to fidelity to our commitments.
In sum, fidelity entails change:
1. If fidelity is commitment to honoring abstract aspirational
commitments, not to following concrete original expectations
of how those commitments should be applied.
2. If fidelity is commitment to living under our constitutional
framework as an “experiment” in constitutional self-government as opposed to an authoritarian command that we must
follow.
3. If fidelity is building out our framework with coherence, integrity, and responsibility versus following original expected
applications and longstanding historical practices.
4. If fidelity is redemption of the Constitution’s promises, not
adherence to its concrete original meanings and longstanding historical practices.
VIII. THE MORAL READING IS SUPERIOR
CONSTITUTIONALISM

TO

LIVING

I want to make clear that I am not advocating living constitutionalism or judicial “updating” of the Constitution as an alternative to
originalism. I always say, the only thing I hate as much as originalism is living constitutionalism. Some readers may think that
Dworkin’s and my approaches are versions of living constitutionalism, but they are importantly different from it.
In the larger book of which this essay is a part,112 I shall suggest
that the prospects for reconciliation between Balkin’s and Solum’s
new originalisms and moral readings are greater than those between
new originalisms and living constitutionalism. The basic reason is
that the new originalists and moral readers share a commitment to
constitutional fidelity: to interpretation and construction that best
fits and justifies the Constitution. Living constitutionalists characteristically are more pragmatic, instrumentalist, and forward-looking
111. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 743 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he source of [the] right to refuse treatment was not just a commonlaw rule. Rather, this right is an aspect of a far broader and more basic concept of
freedom that is even older than the common law. This freedom embraces not merely a
person’s right to refuse a particular kind of unwanted treatment, but also her interest
in dignity, and in determining the character of the memories that will survive long
after her death.”).
112. FLEMING, supra note 4.
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in their approaches to the Constitution and, as such, tend to be antifidelity. Though, truth be told, most living constitutionalists who supposedly think this way are fabrications created in the minds of
originalists like Chief Justice Rehnquist (see his “The Notion of a Living Constitution”113) and Justice Scalia (see his discussion of “the
Living Constitution” in his A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
and the Law114).
Dworkin made such arguments long ago in Taking Rights Seriously,115 but they have been neglected. I shall briefly recall them here
(Barber and I fully elaborate such arguments in our book, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions116). Dworkin argued that
the Constitution embodies concepts rather than the founders’ specific
conceptions of those concepts.117 As he subsequently put it, the Constitution embodies interpretive concepts.118 He argued that fidelity in
constitutional interpretation requires elaborating those concepts—
rather than enforcing the founders’ specific conceptions of them—in
quest of our best understanding of those concepts.119
Dworkin contended that arguments for “living constitutionalism”
were vulnerable:
Those who ignore the distinction between concepts and conceptions . . . are forced to argue in a vulnerable way. They
say that ideas of cruelty change over time, and that the
Court must be free to reject out-of-date conceptions; this suggests that the Court must change what the Constitution
enacted. But in fact the Court can enforce what the Constitution says only by making up its own mind about what is
cruel. . . . If those who enacted the broad clauses had meant
to lay down particular conceptions, they would have found
the sort of language conventionally used to do this, that is,
they would have offered particular theories of the concepts
in question.120
Indeed, many liberal living constitutionalists have argued in the “vulnerable way” sketched by Dworkin, leaving them open to the charge
that they do not care about fidelity to the Constitution but instead
want to change or update it.
Liberal constitutional theorists need a rhetoric of fidelity and redemption, as Dworkin and Balkin well know and have powerfully
113. Rehnquist, supra note 7.
114. SCALIA, supra note 8, at 37-48.
115. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136 (1977) [hereinafter TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
116. BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 6, at 13-33.
117. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 115, at 134-36.
118. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 76, at 158-70.
119. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 115, at 134-36.
120. Id. at 136.
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demonstrated. To be sure, liberal living constitutionalism is on firmer
ground now than it was when Dworkin wrote. In particular, David
Strauss has given it its most persuasive formulation to date, framing
it as a common law constitutional interpretation121 rather than simply a forward-looking program for changing or updating the
Constitution. Strauss convincingly shows the extent to which (1) common law constitutional interpretation rather than originalism has
been our practice; (2) common law constitutional interpretation provides better constraints upon judicial decision making than does
originalism; and (3) common law constitutional interpretation rather
than the formal procedures of Article V has been our procedure for
change.122 He gives living constitutionalism a grounding, rigor, and
structure that it previously lacked.
Yet, I have argued, Strauss’s common law constitutional interpretation would be more compelling if it were interpreted or
reconstructed as a moral reading.123 For common law constitutional
interpretation is not just a matter of making forward-looking, unbounded judgments of fairness and good policy. I have suggested that
there are affinities between the aspiration of common law constitutional interpretation to “work[s] itself pure” and the aspiration of
moral readings, in Dworkin’s famous formulation, to interpret the
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be.124 We should interpret the Constitution so as to redeem its promises: through working
them out with coherence, integrity, and responsibility, rather than
engaging in anti-fidelity living constitutionalist talk about “updating”
the Constitution.
IX. WHY ORIGINALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
NOT ELSEWHERE?

BUT

Finally, I shall ponder the reasons for the grip of originalism in
our constitutional culture as contrasted with its rejection elsewhere.
Some originalists assert or assume that originalism is what interpretation just is, as a matter of fact.125 Others assert or assume that
originalism is what interpretation should be, as a normative matter.126 Both are evidently universalist assertions or assumptions
about interpretation, not contingent claims about American constitutional interpretation and practice. I am not a comparative
121. STRAUSS, supra note 60.
122. Id. at 33-49, 77-92, 115-39.
123. James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral
Readings of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1171, 1177-85 (2012).
124. Id. at 1179-80; DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 255.
125. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1250 (1994); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L. J. 1823 (1997).
126. I interpret Larry Solum as belonging in this camp. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra
note 2, at 36-64.
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constitutional law scholar, but I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation at
Princeton University under Walter Murphy, the greatest political science comparative constitutional law scholar of his generation. The
first thing I learned about comparative constitutional law from Murphy was that originalism is peculiar to the United States and that it
is rejected elsewhere.127 Indeed, among many if not most domestic
constitutional theorists and comparativists, this seems to be the conventional wisdom.128
If true, this conventional wisdom (1) refutes the matter of fact
claim and (2) casts doubts upon the normative claim. First, it is not
the fact of the matter that interpretation just is originalism. Second,
although it could be the case that American originalists are right,
normatively —and everyone else in the world is wrong—it is more
likely that there are contingent reasons for originalism’s normative
appeal (at least to some) in the United States. As mentioned above,
McGinnis and Rappaport concede that their arguments for originalism and the good Constitution in the United States are contingent,
not universal.129 Viewing the normative arguments as contingent, we
should ask, what accounts for the appeal of originalism in the United
States but not elsewhere?
I acknowledge that, in recent years, some comparativists have
questioned this conventional wisdom. They have suggested that
originalism is not so peculiarly American after all.130 But we need to
bear in mind the distinction I drew above: (1) Original meaning in a
generic sense as one source among several available sources versus
(2) originalism as an ism, as a claim that original meaning conceived
at a very specific level of abstraction is the only legitimate source of
constitutional meaning. The comparativists who find originalism
here, there, and everywhere most likely are finding original meaning
in a generic sense as one source among several.131 I doubt that they
are finding what I call originalism as an ism outside the United
States. No doubt, resort to original meaning in a generic sense is used
127. Murphy later developed this argument in his magnum opus. WALTER F. MURCONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL
ORDER (2007).
128. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1
(2009); Jack M. Balkin, Why Are Americans Originalist?, in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL (David Schiff &
Richard Nobles eds., forthcoming 2015). For a critique of Greene, see David Fontana,
Response: Comparative Originalism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 189 (2010).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
130. Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study,
44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239, 1247-48 (2011) (arguing that “the Turkish Constitutional Court has employed a convoluted combination of most of the versions of
originalism that have found a following in the United States”).
131. Bradley Miller, Beguiled By Metaphors: The “Living” Tree, 22 CAN. J. L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 331, 343 (2009) (“The orthodox Canadian view is that while original
intentions or understandings may be relevant to interpretation, the judge may decide
that they have little or no weight.”).
PHY,
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elsewhere. For example, Australian comparative scholar Jeffrey
Goldsworthy says that we find “moderate” originalism (roughly, what
I am calling generic consideration of original meaning) elsewhere, but
not “extreme” originalism (roughly, what I am calling originalism as
an ism as found in the United States).132
And so, we should ask what accounts for the appeal of originalism as an ism here in the United States but not elsewhere. I should
say, the appeal of originalism as an ism here in the United States
since the 1970s and 1980s. I shall mention several reasons commonly
given, without conceding that they actually are good reasons for practicing originalism as an ism in the United States. In fact, I believe the
claims that our constitutional culture and practice is originalist are
greatly exaggerated. Indeed, if our constitutional culture and practice
is so originalist, then why is it that originalists are so critical of our
constitutional culture and practice for not being originalist?133
Moreover, I believe that the reasons commonly given for the grip
of originalism in our constitutional culture are better understood as
reasons for the grip of the aspiration to fidelity— explaining recourse
to first principles and the aspiration to fidelity to those first principles—not the grip of originalism as such. I contend that those
reasons in fact show the need for a moral reading or philosophic approach that conceives fidelity as redeeming the promise of our
constitutional commitments, not an authoritarian originalist conception of fidelity as following the relatively specific original meaning (or
original expected applications) of the Constitution. Furthermore, I argue that it is moral readings that are actually doing the work in
invoking conceptions of those first principles and elaborating upon
them. Ironically, the arguments said to explain the appeal of originalism in the United States work better as arguments explaining the
need for a moral reading here.
First reason: In the United States, we had a revolution followed
by a constitutional founding based on “reflection and choice,” as The
Federalist No. 1 put it.134 These experiences, the argument goes,
have fostered a constitutional culture where people, instead of accepting matters as settled, always feel free to recur to first principles
in criticizing existing arrangements.135 Indeed, originalism is characteristically a radical invocation of first principles from which we are
said to have fallen away. These first principles are invoked to justify
overthrowing erroneous precedents and throwing out longstanding
132. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1997).
133. See supra text accompanying note 62.
134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
135. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 74-81; Balkin, supra note 128, at 11-14.
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practices.136 Ironically, originalism may be most appealing where
people are deeply critical of current practices and want radical
change that ostensibly returns to their conceptions of first principles.
Indeed, we will see this borne out in the additional reasons for the
appeal of originalism in the United States.
Second reason: The conservative “counter-revolutionary” reaction against the Warren Court “revolution” (and the early Burger
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade137). As suggested above, before Richard Nixon and Robert Bork launched their attacks on the Warren
Court and the early Burger Court, originalism as we now know it (as
an ism) did not exist.138 Recall what I said about the first reason: The
appeal of originalism consists in its promise of radical change and
ostensible return to originalists’ conceptions of first principles. What
drives this move to originalism clearly are conservative moral readings of the Constitution.
Third reason (related to the second): The conservative counterrevolutionary reaction against the modern regulatory state (emboldened by the Reagan revolution).139 Especially since the
administration of Ronald Reagan, conservatives and libertarians
have called for restoring the lost constitution,140 or the “Constitution
in exile.”141 They argue that progressive and liberal “living constitutionalists” have rewritten the Constitution.142 In doing so, they have
destroyed the goodness of the original founding principles, believed
(fervently) to be conservative and libertarian. Thus, the abandonment of founding principles has enabled the rise of the modern
regulatory and welfare state. If only we could restore the original,
lost Constitution—through originalism. But what fuels this counterrevolutionary fervor, again, are conservative moral readings: conservative conceptions of liberty against government that they believe
put the founding in its best light, not a concern for fidelity to concrete
original meanings for its own sake.
Fourth reason: The poverty of constitutional theory (both in
originalism and its alternatives). Originalists commonly charge that
“you can’t beat somebody with nobody,”143 or say that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”144 The presuppositions are that originalism is
the traditional, familiar view and that it is a cogent theory. Even if
136. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 361 n.5; Balkin, supra note 128, at 11-14.
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
139. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 680-81 (2009).
140. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 62.
141. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2003 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 7.
142. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
143. Scalia, supra note 27, at 855.
144. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 2, at 73-75.
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originalism itself, truth be told, was not much of a theory. It passed,
so originalists say, for the common sense of the matter.145 But, if so,
originalism passed for common sense in a generic sense rather than
in the specific sense of originalism as an ism. The further presupposition is that there really is no alternative cogent theory. This view, I
believe, was reinforced by the poverty of the rhetoric of the living constitution (at least prior to the publication of Strauss’s The Living
Constitution in 2010146) and the poverty of constitutional theory generally (at least prior to the publication of Dworkin’s Taking Rights
Seriously in 1977147 and John Hart Ely’s Democracy and Distrust in
1980148). But constitutional theory is richer today, and there are cogent alternatives to originalism, including Strauss’s common law
constitutional interpretation and Dworkin’s moral reading. Meanwhile, originalism itself has split into warring camps. Indeed, in my
“The Balkanization of Originalism,”149 I have argued that the only
thing originalists agree upon is their rejection of living constitutionalism (and moral readings).
Fifth reason: Written constitution coupled with the constitutional protestantism of our constitutional culture (by “protestantism,”
I mean the view that not only courts but also other institutions and
ultimately every citizen may share in the responsibility of interpreting the Constitution150). Relatedly, written constitution as the font of
our civil religion.151 This is said to explain why Americans are
originalist.152 Yet, ironically, originalism tends to promote the juridic
lawyer’s constitution, conceiving it as terms of art to be understood
only through specialized legal knowledge of original meanings.153
(Not at all a constitutional protestantism after all.) Constitutional
protestantism actually typically expresses itself in the form of moral
readings rather than lawyerly readings. For “the lawyerhood of all
citizens” celebrated by constitutional protestantism actually is more

145. Scalia, supra note 27, at 852.
146. STRAUSS, supra note 60.
147. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 115.
148. ELY, supra note 98.
149. James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10, 11
(2007); Fleming, supra note 19, at 670.
150. For the idea of constitutional protestantism, see, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 1, at
17-18, 93-99; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 40-42 (1988),
151. LEVINSON, supra note 150, at 9-53; Sanford Levinson, “The Constitution” in
American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123. See also Greene, supra note 128, at 7
(“Constitutionalism is often called our civil religion, and the originalism movement
that so glorifies the Constitution’s original understanding is conspicuously commingled with an evangelical movement that tends to disfavor departures from the
original meaning of God’s word”).
152. Balkin, supra note 128, at 7.
153. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3.
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likely to generate readings of the Constitution as embodying moral
principles than as enacting lawyerly terms of art.154
Sixth reason: Written constitution coupled with the promise of
redemption and the belief that the American Constitution is a shining city on a hill.155 The founding is glorified as embodying great
wisdom, leading to worship of the founders.156 If so, the argument or
presupposition seems to be, we have to be originalists to determine
what is so good about the Constitution and to preserve what is good
about it. We see a contemporary version of this argument in McGinnis and Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good Constitution.157 But, I
have argued, to be faithful, to redeem the promises of the shining city
on a hill, we must forsake originalism for the moral reading or philosophic approach.158 And so, this supposed argument for originalism
in the United States works better as an argument for the moral
reading.
X. CONCLUSION: FIDELITY WITHOUT ORIGINALISM AND CHANGE
WITHOUT LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM
In conclusion, we need a theory of fidelity without originalism
and change without living constitutionalism. My project is to develop
such a theory in the form of a constructivist account of the uses of
history in constitutional interpretation.159 A constructivist world
would look somewhat like the pre-originalist world (that is, the preBorkian world), although it would be far more sophisticated theoretically than that world was. It would treat original meaning as one
source of constitutional meaning among several, not the exclusive
source, let alone the exclusive legitimate theory. It would use history
for what it teaches rather than for what it purportedly decides for us.
In a constructivist world, we would understand that history is a
jumble of open possibilities, not authoritative, determinate answers.
We would understand that we—self-styled originalists no less than
the rest of us—always read the past selectively, from the standpoint
of the present, in anticipation of the future. We look to the past, not
154. Sanford Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER’S, May 1977, at
35, 99 n.*.
155. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 74-81; Balkin, supra note 128, at 14-15.
156. Greene, supra note 128, at 63 (“Less charitably, Canadian Supreme Court
Justice Ian Binnie is said to have told a New Zealand conference that ‘the approach of
[his] counterparts in the United States could only be explained by appreciating that
Americans were engaged in a ritual of ancestor worship’”); Balkin, supra note 128, at
14-15.
157. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 3, at 12-14.
158. Justice Brennan made a similar argument regarding the need for a moral
reading to redeem our “shining city upon a hill.” Brennan, supra note 30, at 445.
159. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now?, supra note 12, at 1806-13. In this conclusion, I draw from id. at 1812. In prior work, I have developed a constitutional
constructivism by analogy to John Rawls’s political constructivism. FLEMING, supra
note 6, at 4, 6, 61-64, 92-94 (building upon RAWLS, supra note 49, at 89-129).
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for authoritative answers, but for illumination about our experience
and our commitments.
Finally, we would understand that it dishonors the past to pretend—in the name of originalism—that it authoritatively decides
questions for us, and to pretend that it avoids the burden of making
normative arguments about the meaning of our commitments to abstract moral principles and ends.
I argue that fidelity in interpreting the Constitution as written
requires a moral reading or philosophic approach. No approach—including no version of originalism—can responsibly avoid philosophic
reflection and choice in interpreting the Constitution. Only a moral
reading or philosophic approach has much hope of redeeming the
promise of our commitments to a good Constitution.
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